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Abstract: Ex-post implementation is a notion that addresses “Wilson’s
critique” of non-robust mechanisms, and it has found numerous applications
to collective decision making. We show that only trivial choice functions
are ex-post implementable in generic mechanism design settings with multi-
dimensional signals and interdependent valuations. In other words, ex-post
implementation implies that the same alternative must be chosen irrespective
of agents’ signals. Hence, ex-post implementation is often too strong for
practical use. The proof is based on the observation that implementation
of non-trivial choice functions is only possible if some rates of information
substitution (that depend on the agents’ valuations) coincide for all agents.
This condition amounts to a system of equations that has no solution for
generic valuation functions.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The theory of mechanism design is the most powerful theoretical tool for the
study of collective decision making by privately informed, strategic agents.
Following Harsanyi, interactions with incomplete information have been mostly
modelled in a Bayesian framework. That is, agents’ choices are required to
be optimal at the interim stage where agents know their own signals but only
have beliefs about the distributions of others’ signals. Based on her own be-
liefs about the distributions of signals (and possibly on beliefs and higher
order beliefs of agents), the designer chooses a mechanism that optimizes her
criterion, assuming that agents will subsequently play a Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium.
Wilson (1987) has forcefully pointed out that the success of many of the
implementation schemes used in the above mentioned literature sensitively
depends on the beliefs of the agents or of the mechanism designer: if the
agents or the mechanism designer are mistaken in their beliefs, the actual
outcome of a supposedly optimal mechanism may be very far from the in-
tended one.
Wilson’s concern suggests the use of stronger notions of implementation.
A concept that has recently received a good deal of attention is ex-post im-
plementation, which requires the decision of each agent to be optimal against
the strategies of other agents, independently of the realized characteristics of
other agents.
Ex-post implementation is an appealing notion since a social choice func-
tion that can be ex-post implemented does not require (from agents or de-
signer) any knowledge about the distributions of types. Our main result
raises serious doubts about the practical relevance of this concept by show-
ing that in environments where signals are multi-dimensional and the (quasi-
linear) valuations are interdependent and generic, only constant choice func-
tions are ex-post implementable.
In a class of environments that includes the one we use here, Bergemann
and Morris (2004) provided a strong formal argument in favor of ex-post
implementation as a notion of robust implementation that addresses Wilson’s
critique: working with universal type spaces ` al aH a r s a n y i - M e r t e n s - Z a m i r ,
they showed that a social choice function is ex-post implementable for some
given, payoﬀ-relevant types if and only it is Bayes-Nash implementable for
every system of beliefs and higher order beliefs that can be associated with
those payoﬀ-types.
2Ledyard (1978) and Dasgupta et. al (1979) oﬀered early, related argu-
ments in favor of dominant strategy implementation, which is equivalent to
ex-post implementation in frameworks with private values. More recently,
Chung and Ely (2004) oﬀer a diﬀerent rationale for dominant strategy mech-
anisms in private values frameworks: they argue that the designer’s belief
about the agents’ beliefs is unlikely to be reliable, whereas her belief about
the payoﬀ-relevant part of the agents’ signals is usually more reliable (as it
can be assessed from past experiences).2 In their framework, the worst-case
scenario of any Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanism performs worse
than the expected outcome of the dominant strategy mechanism (that is
independent of agents’ beliefs). Accordingly, a ”maxmin” designer should
choose a dominant strategy mechanism.
The interest and attractiveness of dominant strategy implementation has
been dampened by the classical impossibility result (for private values envi-
ronments) due to Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975). However, their
result requires ”rich enough” type spaces, and positive results are possi-
ble for restricted but still interesting classes of preferences. For settings in
which preferences are not necessarily single-peaked, the most celebrated re-
sult is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves construction for private value settings with
quasi-linear utility: by assigning to each agent a transfer equal to the sum
of others’ valuations in the chosen social alternative, all individual payoﬀ
maximization problems become identical to the maximization of social sur-
plus, yielding the dominant strategy implementation of the eﬃcient choice
function. In particular, the eﬃcient social choice function can be ex-post
implemented irrespectively of the dimension of the private information held
by the agents in the private value setting.
The assumption of private values is very restrictive, however, and recent
research has focused on models with interdependent values (while still retain-
ing the assumption of quasi-linearity), i.e. on models where agents’ payoﬀs
d e p e n do nt h ee n t i r ep r o ﬁle of private signals, and not only on their own
information.3 Many practical choice problems ﬁtw e l li ns u c has e t u p . F o r
the sake of illustration, consider two examples: 1) A committee has to decide
whether to hire candidate A or candidate B (think about the hiring decisions
in your own department). The committee’s members have private informa-
tion on some aspects of the quality of the two candidates. Since there are two
candidates, and since there are often several dimensions of quality (research,
2Note that choosing among ex-post implementable social choice functions does require
some knowledge about the distribution of the payoﬀ-relevant part of agents’ types.
3Quasi-linearity is usually regarded as a legitimate assumption when the ﬁnancial stakes
are moderate.
3teaching ability, etc.) the private information is typically multi-dimensional.
Clearly, all members care about the information held by all agents, and, usu-
ally there are many diﬀerent and potentially conﬂicting views about how to
aggregate the various dimensions of quality. Thus, it is implausible to impose
a-priori assumptions of speciﬁc functional relations between the preferences of
the committee members. 2) International negotiations about environmental
standards also involve interdependent values with multidimensional signals
because each country usually has some private information, based on data
from its national ﬁrms on the (partly common) cost associated with comply-
ing with the various standards, and data from its citizen about their attitudes
toward pollution. Cross-subsidies between countries make the assumption of
transferable utilities plausible in this application.
A substantial amount of research has been devoted to extending the
Clarke-Groves-Vickrey approach to frameworks with interdependent valua-
tions.4 However, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) have shown that, if at least one
agent holds a multi-dimensional signal (and distributions of signals are inde-
pendent across agents), the eﬃcient social choice function cannot generically
be Bayes-Nash implemented. Thus, a fortiori, the eﬃcient social choice func-
tion cannot be ex-post implemented. But, that result does not rule out the
possibility that social choice functions other than the eﬃcient one can be ex-
post implemented, and it naturally raises the question about ”second-best”
or constrained-eﬃcient social choice functions. By ruling out the generic im-
plementation of all non-trivial choice functions, the present paper casts a
much more serious doubt on the usefulness of ex-post implementation. We
want to stress that our result does not say merely: “For any given social
choice function, the set of valuation functions that are compatible with the
ex-post implementation of that social choice function is non-generic.” This
would be an easy extension of the Jehiel—Moldovanu impossibility result.
In contrast, we assert the much stronger statement: “For generic valuation
functions, only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable.”
The ﬁrst step in our analysis derives a geometric condition on valuation
functions that must be satisﬁed for a non-trivial choice function to be imple-
mentable. The second step shows that this condition cannot be generically
4Cremer and McLean (1985), Ausubel (1997), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2001), Bergemann and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002) and Perry and Reny (2002) construct
eﬃcient, ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms for various settings with interdependent
values. These results assume that agents’ signals are one-dimensional, and that valuations
satisfy a Single Crossing Property (SCP). Maskin (2003) oﬀers an excellent survey of
the literature. Jehiel et al. (2004) study the alignment of agents’ interests by means of
potential functions.
4satisﬁed, where the notion of genericity is either topological or measure-
theoretic.
The geometric condition connects the agents’ rates of information sub-
stitution: these measure how marginal variations in the several dimensions
of one agent’s signal aﬀect the agents’ payoﬀs. It is derived from a taxation
principle which states that, in an ex-post incentive compatible mechanism,
agents must agree on a favorite alternative in every state of the world. By
this principle, the set of indiﬀerence states - where an agent is indiﬀerent
between two given alternatives - must be the same for all agents. On this
common set, marginal variations in agent i’s signal must aﬀect all agents’
payoﬀs in the same way. But, with multidimensional signals and generic val-
uations it is impossible to construct transfers that equate the resulting rates
of information substitution.
The condition for eﬃcient ex-post implementation obtained in Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2001) is stronger than the present condition for non-trivial imple-
mentation, yet structurally similar. Agent i’s preferences must, in a sense, be
aligned with social preferences in order to ensure eﬃcient implementation. In
contrast, we need here alignment between the preferences of any two agents
i and j. But, whereas the social preferences are exogenously ﬁxed by the
valuation functions, agent j’s preferences can be altered via an endogenous
transfer. Therefore, proving the impossibility of non-trivial ex-post imple-
mentation is considerably harder than the impossibility of eﬃcient ex-post
implementation. To illustrate a notable diﬀerence: while our present im-
possibility result requires the presence of at least two agents having at least
two-dimensional signals, the Jehiel—Moldovanu impossibility result requires
only that at least one agent has a multidimensional signal (other agents need
not even have private information).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the
mechanism design problem, we deﬁne the ex-post equilibrium concept, and
we derive a helpful ”taxation principle.” In Section 3 we state the generic
impossibility result about implementation in ex-post equilibrium, and we il-
lustrate how the main geometric applies to a speciﬁce x a m p l e .T h i ss e c t i o n
concludes with two remarks on dictatorial and eﬃcient choice functions, re-
spectively. In Section 4 we discuss the main assumptions that underlie our
result. In particular, we show that non-trivial implementation is possible
in settings where either only one agent has a multi-dimensional signal. We
also mention several interesting, but non-generic settings where non-trivial
implementation is possible even if several agents have multi-dimensional sig-
nals. In Section 5 we gather several concluding remarks. In particular, we
5discuss some links to weaker implementation concepts such as Bayes-Nash
and posterior implementation. Most proofs are collected in an Appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider a setting with N ∈ N agents i,j ∈ N, who will be aﬀected by a
decision between K ∈ N alternatives k ∈ K.A g e n ti’s utility ui = vi
k − ti is
determined by a quasi-linear utility function, taking into account the chosen
alternative k and a monetary payment ti ∈ R. Her valuation vi
k = vi
k (s)f o r
alternative k depends on the state of the world s ∈ S.
Each agent holds private information si ∈ Si on the state of the world
s ∈ S. The signal si results from an exogenous draw. There is no loss of
generality in assuming that the agents’ joint information (si)i∈N completely
determines the state of the world s. We thus identify states of the world with
signal combinations: S =
Q
j∈NSj. As usual, the information of every agent
but i is denoted by s−i ∈ S−i. We adopt the usual notation s−i =( sj)j∈N,j6=i
and s =( si,s −i), when we focus on agent i. We assume Si =[ 0 ,1]
di
,a n d
assume v t ob eas m oo t hf u n c t i o no nS.5 We denote by ∇si the di-dimensional
vector of derivatives with respect to si,a n db y∂ρ the directional derivative
in direction ρ ∈ Rdi. Two vectors x,y ∈ Rd are co-directional if x = λy for
λ ≥ 0.
W ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nc h o i c ef u n c t i o n sψ : S → K, with the property that
there are transfers functions ti : S → R, such that truth-telling is an ex-
post equilibrium in the incomplete information game that is induced by
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ψ(s) (s) − t
i (s) ≥ v
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for all si,e si ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i,w h e r es := (si,s −i). We shall call such ψ
implementable. We call a choice function ψ trivial, if it is constant on the
interior intS o ft h et y p es p a c e . 6
By requiring optimality of i’s truth-telling for every realization of other
agents information s−i, equation (1) treats s−i as if it was known to agent i.
5Assuming Si to be the closure of any open connected subset of Rdi
would suﬃce as
well.
6Restricting attention to the interior of the type space is justiﬁed since the interior
has full measure. This assumption is necessary since the main geometric argument in the
proof fails on the boundary of the type space. Alternatively, we could have assumed open
type spaces to start with.
6Her incentive constraint is thus equivalent to a monopolistic screening prob-
lem for every s−i. Thus, the central authority canp o s tp e r s o n a l i z e dp r i c e s
ti
k (s−i) for the various alternatives, and let the individuals choose among
them. In equilibrium all agents must agree on a most favorable alternative:
Lemma 2.1 (Ex-Post Taxation Principle) A choice function ψ is im-
plementable, if and only if for all i ∈ N, k ∈ K and s−i ∈ S−i, there are
transfers (ti














Proof . See Appendix or Chung and Ely (2003).
3 The Impossibility Theorem
In this section we present our generic impossibility result, Theorem 3.2. For
ease of exposition, we assume there are only two agents i,j ∈ {1,2} and
two possible alternatives {k,l}. Because this “2 by 2” model is naturally
embedded in every model with more agents and alternatives, the impossibility
result for this special setting immediately generalizes to the general setting.
Because agents’ incentives are only responsive to diﬀerences in payoﬀs, it






















For technical simplicity, we assume that relative valuations satisfy the mild
requirement ∇siµi (s) 6=0f o ra l ls ∈ S.7
We use two notions of genericity. The ﬁrst is topological. If E is a
complete metric space, recall that every open subset U ⊂ E also admits
a complete metric. A subset A ⊂ U is residual in U if A contains the
countable intersection
T
ν∈N Aν of open and dense sets Aν ⊂ U.R e s i d u a l
sets are generally viewed as (topologically) large, and their complements as
small. In particular, the Baire Category Theorem guarantees that residual
sets are dense.
7That is, agent i’s relative valuation is everywhere responsive to i’s own signal. Theorem
3.2 can be adapted to allow for relative valuations that are not everywhere responsive
to own signals – and in particular to allow for interior maxima – but the additional
complication makes the argument less transparent without adding any useful insights.
7The second notion of genericity is measure-theoretic. Let E be a complete
metric topological vector space, U an open subset of E and A aB o r e ls u b s e t
of U. We say that A is ﬁnitely shy in U if there is a ﬁnite dimensional
subspace F ⊂ E such that A meets every translate of F in a set of Lebesgue
measure 0 (equivalently, if every translate of A meets F in a set of Lebesgue
measure 0).8.A B o r e l s e t A ⊂ U is ﬁnitely prevalent in U if the relative
complement U \ A is ﬁnitely shy in U. Hunt et. al. (1992) and Anderson
and Zame (2001) have argued that ﬁnite prevalence, and prevalence, which is
a generalization, provide a sensible measure-theoretic notion of “largeness”
for inﬁnite-dimensional spaces of parameters. In particular, if E = Rn then
B = U \ A is ﬁnitely prevalent in U if and only if the Lebesgue measure of
A is 0.
In general, these two notions of genericity are diﬀerent – even in ﬁnite
dimensional spaces. However, aside from a technical issue of the degree of
diﬀerentiability required of the relative valuation function under considera-
tion, we show that ex-post implementation is generically impossible in both
the topological and measure-theoretic senses.
Deﬁnition 3.1 For each m ≥ 1,L e tCm(S,R2) be the (Banach) space of
maps S → R2 that admit an m-times continuously diﬀerentiable extension
to an open neighborhood of S, equipped with the topology of uniform conver-
gence of maps and m derivatives. Let Hm ⊂ Cm(S,R2) be the open subset
consisting of those pairs of relative valuation functions (µ1,µ 2) ∈ Cm(S,R2)
for which the partial gradients ∇siµi do not vanish anywhere on S.
Theorem 3.2 Assume that the individual signal spaces have dimensions
d1 ≥ 2 and d2 ≥ 2, respectively. Fix an integer r>2d1+1
d1−1 and set k =
dr +2 d1 +1− 2d1r ,where d = d1 + d2.
1. There is a residual subset G1 ⊂ H1 such that for every (µ1,µ 2) ∈ G1,
only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable.
2. There is a residual and ﬁnitely prevalent subset Gk+1 ⊂ Hk+1 such
that for every (µ1,µ 2) ∈ Gk+1, only trivial choice functions are ex-post
implementable.
8If F has dimension n, say, any linear isomorphism between F and Rn induces a
measure on F. All such measures are mutually absolutely continuous, and have the same
null sets. Hence, it is consistent to abuse terminology by saying that a subset of F –o r
any translate of F – has Lebesgue measure 0 if it has measure 0 for one – hence all –
of these induced measures
8The proof of the Theorem consist of two major steps. Proposition 3.5
shows that the existence of a non-trivial ex-post implementable choice func-
tion implies a geometric condition on the gradients of the relative valuation
functions; Proposition 3.6 shows that this geometric condition cannot be
satisﬁed generically.
The proof of Proposition 3.5 relies on a geometric argument on the bound-
ary that separates the areas (in the signal space S) where alternatives k and
l, respectively, are chosen.
Deﬁnition 3.3 The indiﬀerence set I of a choice function ψ,i sd e ﬁned by:
I := ψ
−1 {k} ∩ ψ
−1 {l} ∩ intS. For an indiﬀerence signal b s ∈ I,w ed e ﬁne
the indiﬀerence set with ﬁxed b si to be Ii (b s): ={s ∈ I : si = b si}.
For the sake of illustration, if the choice function ψ maximizes the social






l (s)}) then the social sur-
p l u si st h es a m ea tb o t ha l t e r n a t i v e sk and l whenever the state of the world
s lies in the indiﬀerence set I.
The taxation principle states that, in an incentive compatible mechanism,
all agents agree that the chosen alternative is the most favorable one. Assum-
ing, for now, that relative transfers τ are continuous, this implies that the
indiﬀerence set of the choice function and the indiﬀerence sets of all agents
must coincide. The following lemma formalizes this assertion. (The proof of
this lemma and all other proofs are relegated to the Appendix.)
Lemma 3.4 Let (ψ,t) be a non-trivial ex-post incentive compatible mecha-
nism with continuous relative transfers τi.
1. For every b s ∈ intS and i ∈ {1,2}, we have
µ




=0 ⇔ b s ∈ I (3)
2. For all b s ∈ I, Ii (b s)={s ∈ intS : si = b si,µ −i(s)=µ−i(b s)} is a
(d−i − 1)-dimensional sub-manifold of intS.
If relative transfers are diﬀerentiable, the gradient of an agent’s payoﬀ
function is perpendicular to her indiﬀerence set. Thus, the coincidence of
9the agents’ indiﬀerence sets as expressed in (3) implies that the gradients of
agents’ payoﬀ functions must be co-directional on the indiﬀerence set:
µ
∇siµi (s)




∇siµ−i (s) −∇ siτ−i (si)
∇s−iµ−i (s)
¶
are co-directional on I (4)
Equation (4) says that the payoﬀ functions of agent i and −i have the
same rate of information substitution: the relative eﬀect on payoﬀso fc h a n g -
ing any two dimensions of the signal must coincide for all agents.
Proposition 3.5 Let (ψ,t) be a non-trivial ex-post incentive compatible mech-
anism.
1. If the relative transfers τi are continuous on intS−i for all i ∈ {1,2}
then, there are an indiﬀerence signal b s ∈ I,a n dav e c t o ry ∈ Rdi such
that
∇siµ
i (s) and (∇siµ
−i (s) − y)
are co-directional for every s ∈ I
i (b s)( 5 )
2. If relative transfers τ−i are discontinuous at b si ∈ intSi for some i ∈
{1,2} then, locally, agent i’s incentives do not depend on s−i.T h a ti s ,




are co-directional for every q ∈ Q (6)
For diﬀerentiable relative transfer functions, a proof for Proposition 3.5 is
simple: Take any s =( b si,s −i) ∈ Ii(b s). By considering a slight perturbation si
ε
in a neighborhood of b si such that sε =( si
ε,s −i) ∈ I, equation (4) implies that
∇siµi (s)a n d∇siµ−i (s)−∇ siτ−i (b si)m u s tb ec o - d i r e c t i o n a la ts =( b si,s −i).
Letting y = ∇siτ−i (b si) yields equation (5). The full proof (see Appendix) is
slightly more complicated in large part because the relative transfer functions
a r en o tk n o w nt ob ed i ﬀerentiable, or even continuous.
10T h es e c o n dh a l fo ft h ep r o o fo ft h eI m p o s s i b i l i t yT h e o r e mi st h a tt h e
geometric conditions (5), (6) cannot be generically satisﬁed. To show this,
ﬁx valuation functions µ1,µ 2;f o re a c hb s ∈ intS deﬁne
˜ I
i(b s)={s ∈ intS : s




As in Lemma 3.4, this is a manifold of dimension d−i−1. Moreover, for each
mechanism and each b s ∈ I, Lemma 3.4 guarantees that ˜ Ii(b s)=Ii(b s). Hence
the following Proposition is enough to complete the proof of the Impossibility
Theorem.
Proposition 3.6 There is a residual set G1 ⊂ H1 and a residual and ﬁnitely
prevalent subset Gk+1 ⊂ Hk+1 such that if (µ1,µ 2) ∈ G1 or (µ1,µ 2) ∈ Gk+1
then
(1) there do not exist b s ∈ intS and y ∈ Rd1 such that ∇s1µ2(s) − y and
∇s1µ1(s) are co-directional for every s ∈ ˜ I1(b s)
(2) there do not exist b s ∈ intS and y ∈ Rd2 such that ∇s2µ1(s) − y and
∇s2µ2(s) are co-directional for every s ∈ ˜ I2(b s)
(3) there do not exist b s ∈ intS, y ∈ Rd1, and a non-empty open set Q ⊂ S2
such that y and ∇s1µ1(b s1,q) are co-directional for every q ∈ Q
(4) there do not exist b s ∈ intS, y ∈ Rd2, and a non-empty open set Q ⊂ S1
such that y and ∇s2µ2(b s2,q) are co-directional for every q ∈ Q
Fix an indiﬀerence signal b s ∈ I and a vector y ∈ Rdi.I f ∇siµi(s)
and ∇siµ−i(s) − y are co-directional for every s ∈ Ii(b s)={s ∈ S : si =
b si,µ −i(s)=µ−i(b s)} , then the valuation functions µ1,µ 2 satisfy a certain set
of ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equations. It is not hard to see that generic valu-
ations functions do not satisfy these equations. But the actual argument is
substantially more complicated since the assertion of Proposition 3.6 is that
generic valuation functions do not satisfy these equations for any b s and any
y.I n t u i t i v e l y ,v a r y i n gb s and y only do not oﬀer enough degree of freedom to
guarantee that ∇siµi(s)a n d∇siµ−i(s) − y are co-directional all over Ii(b s).
By way of illustration, we apply now Proposition 3.5 to a setting with
bi-linear valuations and 2-dimensional signals si =( si
k,s i
l) ∈ [0,1]
2.I n t h i s
case, non-trivial implementation implies a simple algebraic condition (that
cannot be satisﬁed generically) on the coeﬃcients of the valuation functions
(See Proposition 6.3 of the Appendix for a generalization to the class of all
polynomials of degrees less than a suﬃciently large K.)


















































































































l =0is necessary for such vectors to remain




l (see Appendix for details). It follows










l =0 . (7)
The above condition is obviously non-generic: the set of parameters where it
is satisﬁed has zero Lebesgue-measure in the 8-dimensional space of coeﬃ-
cients that parameterize the bi-linear valuations in this example.
We conclude this section with two important remarks:
Remark 3.8 Our main result rules out implementation of dictatorial choice
functions. First, note that ”dictatorship” is ambiguous with interdependent
values: 1) If ψ chooses the alternative for which dictator i has the highest
valuation, then ψ(s) depends on everybody’s information s, as the dictator
does not know her favorite alternative. Point 1 of Proposition 3.5 shows that
the agents’ incentive constraints cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed. 2) A dic-
tatorial rule in the sense that ψ(s)=ψ(si) depends only on the dictator’s
information si is generically not implementable either: The relative transfers
to the other agent τ−i (si) has to be discontinuous, and point 2 of the Propo-
sition shows that, generically, i’s incentive constraint cannot be satisﬁed for
all s−i.
12Remark 3.9 The role played by the dimension of the signals has been em-
phasized by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) in the context of eﬃcient Bayes-
Nash implementation. The generic impossibility of ex-post eﬃcient imple-
mentation is obviously a corollary of Theorem 3.2, but we now oﬀer an in-
dependent argument in order to highlight both the similarities and the dif-
ferences between the two results. For the sake of illustration, assume here
that only one agent i holds private information, and that ∇siµN 6=0where
µN =
P
i µi. Eﬃcient ex-post implementation implies that there is a diﬀer-
ence in transfers ∆ = τi, such that society is indiﬀerent between the alter-
natives if and only if this is the case for agent i. Mathematically, the level
set (µi)
−1 (∆) must coincide with the indiﬀerence set of the eﬃcient choice
function Ieff :=
¡
µN¢−1 (0). Therefore, we obtain that:
∇siµ
i (s) and ∇siµ
N (s) are co-directional for all s ∈ I
eff. (8)
Eﬃcient implementation is only possible if there is a congruence between
the private and social rates of information substitution. In contrast, our
present condition for non-trivial implementation requires a congruence of
private rates for any two agents i and −i. Whereas the social preference is
exogenously ﬁxed by the agents’ valuations, agent −i’s preferences can be
easily altered via the endogenous transfer τ−i. Thus, we needed to show
that no transfer whatsoever achieves the required congruence. In particular,
we show below that the presence of at least two agents, each equipped with
a multidimensional signal, is crucial for the present result, whereas, as just
explained, it is not crucial for Jehiel-Moldovanu’s result.
4 The Limits of the Impossibility Result
We now discuss the role played by the following three assumptions :
1) There are multiple (strategic) agents.
2) The signal of at least two agents has multiple dimensions.
3) Valuation functions are generic.
4.1 One strategic agent
Suppose that only agent i is strategic about the release of her information,
whereas the information held by all agents j, j 6= i is freely available to the
13designer. Let ti
k = ti
k(s−i)b ea n yt r a n s f e rt oa g e n ti in alternative k (this may
be constantly zero). The non-trivial social choice function that implements
any outcome k ∈ argmaxk vi
k(s)−ti
k(s−i)f o re v e r ys i g n a lp r o ﬁle s =( si,s −i)
is ex-post implementable. This simple ﬁnding should be contrasted with
the impossibility of eﬃcient implementation in this setting (see Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2001), or the previous section).
4.2 One-dimensional signals
Eﬃcient, ex-post implementation is possible if all agents have one-dimensional
signals, and if a single crossing property holds.9 Our present impossibility
result requires that at least two agents have multi-dimensional signals, and
thus it is silent about what happens if all but one agent have one-dimensional
signals. Consider the following example that shows how positive results can
be obtained in this case:
Example 4.1 There are two agents i =1 ,2 and two alternatives k,l. Agent
1 has a one-dimensional signal s1 ∈ [0,1]. Agent 2 has a two-dimensional
signal, s2 =( s2
k,s 2
l) ∈ [0,1]




1(s) > 0( 9 )
(Note that the set of valuations satisfying this condition is open.) We show
how to implement a social choice function ψ that chooses alternative k for
high values of s1 and chooses alternative l for low values of s1.S e t ﬁrst














1) takes on values above and below zero on S (11)
Consider now the choice function
ψ(s)=
½
k if µ2(s) − τ2(s1) ≥ 0
l if µ2(s) − τ2(s1) < 0 (12)
9This condition is determined by strict inequalities, and it is satisﬁe df o ra no p e ns e t
of valuations.
14By condition (10), for a ﬁxed s2 there is s1(s2) such that
ψ(s)=
½
k if s1 ≥ s1(s2)
l if s1 < s1(s2) (13)
For agent 1 we apply the standard technique from the literature with one-
dimensional signals, and we set transfer τ1(s2)=µ1 (s1(s2)). Using the
monotonicity assumption in equation (9) we get that
ψ(s)=
½
k if µ1(s) − τ1(s2) ≥ 0
l if µ1(s) − τ1(s2) < 0 . (14)
By equations (14) and (12) (ψ,t) is incentive compatible. It is non-trivial by
equation (11). For generic µ, the choice function ψ is non-dictatorial.
4.3 Non-generic valuation functions
Generic impossibility allows for large classes of interesting (yet non-generic)
valuation functions for which non-trivial ex-post implementation is feasible.
F o re x a m p l e ,t h i si st h ec a s ef o rs e p arable valuation functions, i.e. v for
which there are functions fi
k : Si → R, hi























l)(s−i) −∇ s−iτi (s−i)
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As the upper (resp. lower) half of the condition is independent of s−i
(resp. si) the two gradients can be equalized everywhere by setting, for ex-










l)(si) , and similarly for τi (s−i).




In a recent paper, Bikchandani (2004) studies multi-object auction prob-
lems where social alternatives are partitions of goods. The agents do not
15care about the exact partition among others. In other words, at each possi-
ble signal, each agent is indiﬀerent between many alternatives. Bikchandani
s h o w st h a tn o n - t r i v i a le x - p o s ti m p l e m e n t a t i o ni sp o s s i b l ei nt h i so b v i o u s l y
non-generic framework where many of the relevant rates of information sub-
stitution are constant. The needed mechanisms are not ”intuitive”: for ex-
ample, in an one-object auction with two buyers, the object is sold if one
buyer has a low valuation while another has a high valuation, but the object
m u s tr e m a i ni nt h eh a n d so ft h es e l l e ri fb o t hb u y e r sh a v eh i g hv a l u a t i o n s .
In an auction setting, the indiﬀerence among alternatives arises naturally if
there are no allocative externalities among agents. But such an indiﬀerence
seems strong and less appealing in social choice settings where information
can aﬀect the relative value of any two alternatives.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have established the impossibility of non-trivial ex post implementation in
generic quasi-linear environments with interdependent preferences and mul-
tidimensional signal spaces. The main motivation for considering ex-post
implementation (as opposed to Bayes-Nash implementation) is the idea that
t h ea g e n t so rt h ed e s i g n e rm a yh a v ei n s u ﬃcient information about relevant
features of the environment.
Our result does not imply that Bayes-Nash implementation is impos-
sible for any given, speciﬁc beliefs. But, in conjunction with the results in
Bergemann and Morris (2004), it implies that, for any non-trivial mechanism
(social choice rule + transfers), there are beliefs for which this mechanism
is not Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. Thus, robust implementation a la
Bergemann-Morris is generically impossible. At least three signiﬁcant tasks
remain for future research:
1)Identify additional interesting models with restricted classes of pref-
erences where ex-post implementation is possible (i.e. besides frameworks
with single-dimensional signals, or with separable valuations, or auctions of
private goods without allocative externalities).
2)Focus on the possibly weaker conditions needed for robust implemen-
tation of social choice correspondences: suppose that we can establish the
existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for a family of priors, and suppose
it is known that the priors of agents must belong to this family. Then the
social choice correspondence that associates to each signal proﬁle s the set
16of alternatives that may emerge in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (for some of
these priors) can be robustly implemented in the sense that, whatever the
eﬀective prior, there is an equilibrium outcome that belongs to the social
choice correspondence.
3) Identify a fruitful way to address Wilson’s critique in frameworks where
ex-post implementation is not possible.
6 Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . 1 . ”if”: Given ti
k (s−i) such that equation (2) holds,
deﬁne ti (s): =ti
ψ(s) (s−i). Agent i’s problem in the game induced by (ψ,t)
is to choose b si in order to maximize vi
ψ(b si,s−i) (si,s −i) − ti
ψ(b si,s−i) (s−i). B y
equation (2), it is optimal for her to report truthfully b si = si, and let the
choice function ψ pick her most preferred alternative.










ti (si,s −i)i f ψ(si,s −i)=k
∞ if ψ(si,s −i) 6= k for all si ∈ Si. (15)
Note that ti






















By i’s incentive constraint again, she always reports in order to maximize
her payoﬀ.T h u s ,w i t hti
k (s−i)a sd e ﬁned in (15), condition (2) is satisﬁed.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . 4 . 1 )µi (b s)−τi (b s−i)=0a n d∇siµi (b s) 6=0i m p l y
that there are s0i,s 00i arbitrarily close to b si such that µi (s00i,b s−i)−τi (b s−i) <
0 <µ i (s0i,b s−i) − τi (b s−i). Applying the taxation principle to agent i yields
ψ(s0i,b s−i)=k and ψ
1 (s00i,b s−i)=l. Hence b s ∈ I.
For the converse, assume that µi (b s)−τi (b s−i) > 0, say. By continuity, we
have µi (s) − τi (s) > 0, and thus ψ(s)=k, for all s in a neighborhood of b s.
Thus, b s/ ∈ I.
2) is immediate from the above.
3) S i n c ew ea s s u m e dt h a t∇s−iµ−i is non-vanishing, we can apply the







Figure 1: If the gradients of φ and ξ are not co-directional at x, the functions
disagree at some x0, i.e. φ(x0) < 0 < ξ (x0).
To prove Proposition 3.5, we ﬁrst state a simple Lemma.
Lemma 6.1 Let φ and ξ be smooth functions on an open set X ⊂ RN.
Assume that there exists x ∈ X such that φ(x)=ξ (x)=0 ,b u t∇φ(x) and
∇ξ (x) are not co-directional. Then there exists x0 arbitrarily close to x such
that φ(x0) < 0 < ξ (x0).
Proof. As ∇φ(x)a n d∇ξ (x) are not co-directional, there exists a direc-
tion ρ ∈ RN with ρ · ∇φ(x) < 0 < ρ · ∇ξ (x). For x0 = x + ερ,w i t hε > 0,
we get φ(x0) < 0 < ξ (x0), as desired. This argument is illustrated in Figure
1.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Consider an ex-post incentive compatible
mechanism (ψ,t) and the associated relative valuations and transfers.
1) If τ is diﬀerentiable, the discussion preceding the Proposition together
with Lemma 6.1 completes the proof.
More generally, we need to deal with two sub-cases:
1.a) The direction of the gradient ∇siµi (s) does not depend on s ∈
Ii (b s). Instead of showing that τ−i is diﬀerentiable, we directly construct
the vector y. Denote the orthogonal complement of ∇siµi (s)b y( ∇µi)
⊥ ⊂
Rdi and let ρ ∈ (∇µi)
⊥. Fix for a moment s−i with (b si,s −i) ∈ Ii (b s). By
18Lemma 3.4, µ−i (·,s −i) − τ−i (·) must equal zero on the sub-manifold {si :
µi (si,s −i)=µi (b si,s −i)} . Thus, restricted to that manifold, τ−i is diﬀeren-
tiable and we have ∂ρµ−i (b si,s −i)=∂ρτ−i (b si). Therefore, ρ·∇siµ−i (b si,s −i)=
∂ρµ−i (b si,s −i) is independent of (b si,s −i) ∈ Ii (b s).Set now y := ∇siµ−i (b s)+
λ∇siµi (b s). By construction, we have ρ · (∇siµ−i (b si,s −i) − y)=0f o rρ ∈
(∇µi)
⊥.B yc h o o s i n gλ suﬃciently large, ∇siµi (s)a n d( ∇siµ−i (b si,s −i) − y)
must be co-directional, and condition (5) is satisﬁed.
1.b) The direction of the gradient ∇siµi (s)v a r i e si ns ∈ Ii (b s). In this
case we will show that τ−i is diﬀerentiable at some e si close to b si.
As a ﬁrst step, we show that the directional derivatives ∂ρτ−i (b si)i n
directions ρ ∈∇ siµi (b si,s −i)
⊥ exist. Fix s ∈ Ii (b s)a n dρ ∈∇ siµi (s)
⊥
such that there are s,s ∈ Ii (b s)c l o s et os with ρ · ∇siµi (s) > 0 > ρ ·
∇siµi (s). By agent i’s incentive constraint, we have ψ
¡
b si + ερ,s−i¢
= k
and ψ(b si + ερ,s −i)=l for small enough ε > 0 (compare this argument to
the one for Lemma 6.1). In turn, agent (−i)’s incentive constraint implies
∂ρµ−i (s) ≥−
τ−i(b si+ερ)−τ−i(b si)
ε ≥ ∂ρµ−i (s). As s−i and s−i approach s−i,and
ε approaches zero, this entails ∂ρτ−i (b si)=∂ρµ−i (b si,s −i).
By assumption, ∇siµi (b si,s −i)
⊥ varies (continuously) in s−i. Therefore,
∂ρτ−i (b si) exists for an open set of directions ρ ∈ Λ ⊂ Rdi. In order to
conclude, we need to show that these directional derivatives are continuous
in si.
Consider e si = b si+ερ for some ρ ∈ Λ and ε ∈ R suﬃciently small. By the
above argument, there is a neighborhood U of e si, such that the directional
derivatives ∂ρτ−i (si)f o rρ ∈ Λ ⊂ Rdi and si ∈ U exist and are continuous in
si.T h u s ,τ−i is diﬀerentiable for si ∈ U and, after replacing b si by e si,w ec a n
conclude. For an intuition consider Figure 2. 2) Assume now that the relative
transfer τ−i is discontinuous at some b si ∈ intSi . We can assume w.l.o.g. that
τ−i (si) ∈ T−i (si) := [infs−i {µ−i (si,s −i)}, sups−i {µ−i (si,s −i)}] for all si.10
By assumption, there is a sequence of i’s signals (si
n)n∈N such that limn si
n =
b si but such that τ−i (si
n) does not converge to τ−i (b si). Modulo taking a
subsequence, we can assume that limn τ−i (si
n)=τ−i (b si)+ε,f o rε > 0, say.
Consider e S−i := {s−i ∈ S−i : µ−i (b si,s −i) ∈
¡
τ−i (b si)+ε















and agent −i will ”choose” outcome k, no matter what her signal s−i is. This is still the















to the limit, yields
that τ−i ¡
b si¢
+ ε ∈ T−i ¡
b si¢











Figure 2: An illustration of Si ⊂ R2: the directional derivatives ∂ρτj (b si)
exist for directions ρ inside the cone. As ∇siυi (si,s j) is continuous in si,
these directional derivatives also exist in a neighborhood U of e si and are
continuous.
These types s−i ∈ e S−i of agent −i prefer k when the relative payment is
τ−i (b si), but prefer l when the relative payment is τ−i (b si)+ε. Therefore,
ψ(b si,s −i)=k ,b u tψ(si
n,s −i)=l for large enough n.12 As limn s−i
n = b s−i,w e
can apply the taxation principle to agent i to obtain µi (b si,s −i)−τi (s−i)=0 ,
for all s−i ∈ e S−i (recall that µi is continuous).
We now show that the gradients ∇siµi (b si,s −i) are co-directional for all
s−i ∈ e S−i. T h i sp r o v e st h ed e s i r e dr e s u l ts i n c ee S−i is open, and since it
contains the manifolds
©




Assume that this is not the case for s0−i,s 00−i ∈ e S−i (ε). We assume
w.l.o.g. that µ−i (b si,s 0−i) <µ −i (b si,s 00−i). By Lemma 6.1, there is e si,a r b i -
trarily close to b si,w i t hµi (e si,s 00−i)+τi (s00−i) < 0 <µ i (e si,s 0−i)+τi (s0−i).
Thus, ψ(e si,s 0−i)=k and ψ(e si,s 00−i)=l. However, for e si close enough to b si,
continuity of µi yields µi (e si,s 0−i) <µ i (e si,s 00−i). This yields a contradiction
to the monotonicity of ψ and concludes the argument.
We turn now to the proof of the genericity assertion, Proposition 3.6.
Write d = d1 + d2,a n dl e tP2dr be the space of polynomials on Rd of degree

























4 ≤ τ−i ¡
b si¢
+ 3ε





Lemma 6.2 Let s1,...,s r be distinct points in Rd and let {ai :1≤ i ≤ r}
and {aij :1≤ i ≤ r,1 ≤ j ≤ d} be families of real numbers. There is a




Recall that we ﬁxed r>2d1+1
d1−1 and deﬁned k = dr +2 d1 +1− 2d1r.F o r
each i,l e tπi : Rd → Rdi be the projection. We will derive both parts of
Proposition 3.6 from the following ﬁnite dimensional Proposition.
Proposition 6.3 Let L ⊂ Ck+1(S,R2) be any ﬁnite-dimensional subspace
that contains P2dr ×P 2dr,l e tM be any translate of L in Ck+1(S,R2),a n d
let M0 = Hk+1 ∩ M. There are subsets M1,M2,M3,M4 ⊂ M0 that
are residual and have full Lebesgue measure in M0 and enjoy the following
properties.
(1) If (µ1,µ 2) ∈ M1 then there do not exist b s ∈ intS and y ∈ Rd1 such
that ∇s1µ1(s) and ∇s1µ2(s) − y are collinear for every s ∈ ˜ I1(b s).
(2) If (µ1,µ 2) ∈ M2 then there do not exist b s ∈ intS and y ∈ Rd2 such
that ∇s2µ2(s) and ∇s2µ1(s) − y are collinear for every s ∈ ˜ I2(b s).
(3) If (µ1,µ 2) ∈ M3 then there do not exist b s ∈ intS, y ∈ Rd1,a n da
non-empty open set Q ⊂ S2 such that ∇s1µ1(b s1,q) and y are collinear
for every q ∈ Q.
(4) If (µ1,µ 2) ∈ M4 then there do not exist b s ∈ intS, a vector y ∈ Rd2,
and a non-empty open set Q ⊂ S1 such that ∇s2µ2(b s2,q) and y are
collinear for every q ∈ Q.
Moreover, the intersection M∗ =
T
Mi is also residual and has full
Lebesgue measure in M0, and every pair (µ1,µ 2) ∈ M∗ enjoys the four
properties above.
21Proof. Write (int S)(r) for the open subset of (intS)r consisting of dis-
tinct r-tuples. To construct M1,w r i t e







For each n =1 ,...,rdeﬁne


















Φ =( φ1,...,φr):M0 × V → R
(2d1+1)r
Because the components of Φ are either linear functions or evaluations
of ﬁrst derivatives of (k + 1)-times continuously diﬀerentiable functions, Φ
itself is k-times continuously diﬀerentiable. Using Lemma 6.2, it is easy
to check that for every (µ1,µ 2;v) ∈ M0 × V the directional derivatives of
Φ in directions in P2dr ×P 2dr × V span R(2d1+1)r. In particular, for each
(µ1,µ 2;v) ∈ M0 × V the diﬀerential DΦ is onto. Hence, the transversality
theorem (see Mas-Colell (1985) for instance) provides a subset M1 ⊂ M0
that is residual and of full measure such that, for each (µ1,µ 2) ∈ M1,t h es e t
J(µ
1,µ
2)={v ∈ V : Φ(µ
1,µ
2;v)=0 }
is either empty or is a manifold of dimension
dr + r + d
1 + d
1 +1− (2d
1 +1 ) r = dr +2 d
1 +1− 2d
1r
To see that M1 has the desired property (1), suppose not, so that there
exist b s ∈ intS and y ∈ Rd1 such that ∇s1µ1(s)a n d∇s1µ2(s)−y are collinear
for each s ∈ ˜ I1(b s). If z1,...,z r are distinct points of ˜ I1(b s)t h e nw ec a nﬁnd
















22Equivalently, ˜ I1(b s)(r) is a subset of the projection of J(µ1,µ 2)i n t o( i n tS)(r).
Because ˜ I1(b s) has dimension d2 − 1 and projection does not raise the di-
mension of a manifold, it follows that J(µ1,µ 2) must have dimension at least










Since this contradicts our choice of r,w ec o n c l u d et h a tM1 has the desired
property.
To construct M2 we proceed exactly as above, except that we reverse
the roles of µ1,µ 2 . The constructions of M3,M4 use a variant of this same
construction. For M3, write







For each n =1 ,...,rdeﬁne








1,q n) − λny
Finally, write
Φ =( φ1,...,φr):M0 × V → R
d1r
As above, we use the transversality theorem to ﬁnd a residual set of full
measure M3 ⊂ M0 such that if (µ1,µ 2) ∈ M3 then
J(µ
1,µ








1)r + r − d
1r =2 d
1 + r +( d
2 − d
1)r
We claim that if (µ1,µ 2) ∈ M3 then there does not exist b s1 ∈ intS1,
y ∈ Rd1 a n da no p e ns e tQ ⊂ intS2 such that ∇s1µ1(b s1,q)a n dy are collinear
23for each q ∈ Q. To see this, we argue exactly as before: if such existed then
the dimension of J(µ1,µ 2) would be at least as large as rd2, whence
2d










This contradicts our choice of r,s ow ec o n c l u d et h a tM3 has the desired
property. To construct M4 we proceed exactly as above, except that we
reverse the roles of µ1,µ 2.
Finally, M∗ is residual and of full measure because it is the intersection
of a ﬁnite number of sets with these properties.
With Proposition 6.3 in hand, we turn to the proof of Proposition 3.6.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 6 . We begin by constructing Gk+1 as the
intersection of four sets W1,...,W4, corresponding to the various properties,
a n dt h e nu s eP r o p o s i t i o n6 . 3t os h o wt h a tGk+1 has the desired properties.
To construct W1 and W2 we proceed in the following way. First choose
and ﬁx an increasing sequence of compact sets L1,L 2,..., whose union is
intS1.F o r e a c h i n d e x m,l e tC(m)b et h es e to fp a i r s( µ1,µ 2) ∈ Hk+1 for
which there exist b s ∈ Lm, y ∈ Rd1 with |y| ≤ m,a n das u b s e tZ ⊂ ˜ I1(b s)s u c h
that:
• for every z ∈ Z there is a λ ∈ R such that µ1(z)−λ[µ2(z)−y]=0a n d
|λ| ≤ m
• the projection of Z into some d2−1-dimensional subspace of Rd contains
a ball of radius at least 1/m
It is straightforward to check that each C(m) is a closed subset of Hk+1,








We construct W2 in exactly the same way, except that the roles of µ1,µ 2 are
reversed.
To construct W3 and W4, we proceed as follows. For each index m,l e t
K(m)b et h es e to fp a i r s( µ1,µ 2) ∈ Hk+1 for which there exist b s ∈ Lm,
y ∈ Rd1 with |y| ≤ m,a n dab a l lB ⊂ S2 such that:
24• for every b ∈ B there is a λ ∈ R such that µ1(b s1,b) − λy =0a n d
|λ| ≤ m
• the radius of B is at least 1/m













Wi.B yd e ﬁnition, Gk+1is the countable intersection of open
sets, and, in particular, is a Borel set.
To see that Gk+1 is ﬁnitely prevalent in Hk+1,d e ﬁne L = P2dr and let






∩ M ⊂ M
∗
Hence Proposition 6.3 implies that Hk+1\Gk+1 meets every translate of L in
a set of Lebesgue measure 0. By deﬁnition, therefore, Hk+1 \G k+1 is ﬁnitely
shy in Hk+1 ,a n dGk+1 is ﬁnitely prevalent in Hk+1.
To see that Gk+1 is residual in Hk+1,l e tF ⊂ Ck+1(S,R2)b ea n yﬁnite
dimensional subspace that contains P2dr. It follows from Proposition 6.3 that
Gk+1 ∩ F has full Lebesgue measure in Hk+1 ∩ F; in particular, Gk+1 ∩ F is
dense in Hk+1 ∩ F. Because Ck+1(S,R2) is the union of ﬁnite dimensional
subspaces that contain F0 ,w ec o n c l u d et h a tGk+1 is dense in Hk+1. Because
our construction guarantees that Gk+1 is the countable intersection of open
s e t s ,w ec o n c l u d et h a ti ti sr e s i d u a li nHk+1,a sd e s i r e d .
To construct G1 we proceed in almost the same way, except that we work
in H1 instead of in Hk+1.F o r e a c h i n d e x m,l e tC(m)b et h es e to fp a i r s
(µ1,µ 2) ∈ H1 for which there exist y ∈ Rd1 with |y| ≤ m and a subset
Z ⊂ Lm such that
• for every z ∈ Z there is a λ ∈ R such that µ1(z)−λ[µ2(z)−y]=0a n d
|λ| ≤ m
• the projection of Z into some d2−1-dimensional subspace of Rd contains
a ball of radius at least 1/m.
25It is straightforward to check that each C(m) is a closed subset of H1,s o








We construct V2 in exactly the same way, except that the roles of µ1,µ 2 are
reversed. For each index m,l e tK(m)b et h es e to fp a i r s( µ1,µ 2) ∈ H1 for
which there exist b s1 ∈ Lm, y ∈ Rd1 with |y| ≤ m,a n dab a l lB ⊂ S2 such
that
• for every b ∈ B there is a λ ∈ R such that µ1(b s1,b) − λy =0a n d
|λ| ≤ m
• the radius of B is at least 1/m









We construct V4 in exactly the same way, except that the roles of µ1,µ 2 are
reversed.
Now set G1 =
T
Vi.B y d e ﬁnition, G1 is the countable intersection of
open sets. In order to show that it is residual in H1, we need only show it
is dense. To this end, view Ck+1(S,R2) as a subset of C1(S,R2), and note
that Gk+1 ⊂ G1 and Hk+1 ⊂ H1. Malgrange (1966) shows that Ck+1(S,R2)
is dense in C1(S,R2). Because Hk+1 is open in Ck+1(S,R2) , it follows that
Hk+1 is dense in H1. Our above construction shows that Gk+1 is dense in
Hk+1, and hence in H1. Because Gk+1 ⊂ G1 it follows that G1 is dense in
H1. By construction, G1 is the countable intersection of open sets, so that,
as asserted, it is residual in H1.
Remark 6.4 The relevant property required of the space of polynomials of
degree at most 2dr is embodied in Lemma 6.2: given r distinct points, we can
ﬁnd polynomials whose values and ﬁrst partials can be speciﬁed arbitrarily
at those points. Any other space with this property would do as well. Note,
however, that the space of separable relative valuation functions does not
26have this property: If µ is a separable relative valuation function and the





for 1 ≤ i ≤ d1.
Proof for Example 3.7. If (ψ,t) is a non-trivial incentive compatible
ex-post mechanism with continuous relative transfers τi, condition (5) must
be satisﬁed: there is b s ∈ I, ∆ := µi (b s)a n d( yk,y l)
T ∈ R2, such that for all



























F o rt h i st ob et r u ea ts o m es, the cross product of these vectors must vanish,

































We now argue, that the above condition can be satisﬁed for all s in the
set Ii (b s) only if the coeﬃcients a,b satisfy the algebraic condition (7).

































l 6=0 , we










l 6= 0. Substitut-
ing for s
−i
k in condition (16), we see that this equation can only hold on
all of Ii (b s)i ft h ec o e ﬃcient of the quadratic term in s
−i


















=0 . This implies condition (7). Finally, for the
case of discontinuous transfers τi, condition (6) reduces here to bi
k = bi
l =0 ,
so that condition (7) is satisﬁed.
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